





Good Samaritan laws are, at their core, legislative public health interventions. These laws abrogate the common law right of redress and the public interest in criminal justice to promote a greater good—encouraging would-be Levites to become Samaritans for fellow citizens in their hours of need. As such, these laws embody public health significance. But do they achieve as much? While most traditional Good Samaritan laws in the United States have been around for more than half of a century, there exists very little insight into whether they have actually achieved their basic public health purpose of encouraging (or compelling) spontaneous care in emergency situations. A public health appraisal of these Good Samaritan laws is difficult, in part, because of the statutory variability among them and the lack of reliable data sources or legislative benchmarks informing them. A wide array of laws might be considered related to or aligned with Good Samaritan ideology, but this paper focuses only on laws that indemnify actors from liability for spontaneously rendering emergency aid in emergency situations. This paper discusses various methods for measuring the policy outcome of these laws and insists on greater intentionality in the legislative process to urge that future policymaking in this area be the product of responsible, evidence-based decisions rather than uninformed guesswork.
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1.	Introduction: Public Health and the Law
Some of the earliest philosophes recognized law as the sine qua non of a civilized society. Plato and Aristotle wrote about the “evident need for persons who will articulate and enforce standards of conduct which will tend to promote the common good of bodily security, stable access to resources, cooperation in economic and educational activities, and rectification of . . . inter-personal injuries . . . and neglect.”​[1]​ Laws govern society by regulating individual and collective conduct through a normative conduit.​[2]​ To the extent that laws aim to modulate behavior for broader public interests, they tend to represent social mores and cultural values. Laws, in this way, are the embodiment of ideal civilization. 
While the notion of “public health” may be as old as the biblical isolation of lepers,​[3]​ the modern conception of public health is a more recent phenomenon. Following the ravages of the Black Plague and other epidemic diseases spread by sea trade, nations began imposing quarantine measures on incoming ships to prevent domestic contagion. More targeted efforts at improving the public’s health would not come until some time after John Snow’s paradigm-shifting discovery at Soho’s Broad Street pump. The turn of the 20th century marked “a golden age for public health, when its achievements followed one another in dizzying succession and its future possibilities seemed limitless.”​[4]​ Though this sorghum view of public health may have changed in the last 100 years, its successes continue to alleviate the specter of the worst diseases and disparities well into the 21st century; sophisticated data collection and analysis help modern day practitioners develop evidence-based interventions for specific demographics, bolstering population health. 
The crossover between the realms of law and public health gives us public health law. Just what constitutes a public health law, however, is not a clear-cut matter.​[5]​ Lawrence Gostin, one of the nation’s preeminent authorities on public health law, defines “public health law” as: 
[T]he study of the legal powers and duties of the state, in collaboration with its partners (e.g., health care, business, the community, the media, and academe), to assure the conditions for people to be healthy (to identify, prevent, and ameliorate risks to health in the population) and the limitations on the power of the state to constrain the autonomy, privacy, liberty, proprietary, or other legally protected interests of individuals for the common good. The prime objective of public health law is to pursue the highest possible level of physical and mental health in the population, consistent with the values of social justice.​[6]​

Consistent with Gostin’s postulate, public health law can also be understood from a distributive justice perspective, wherein “the burdens and risks [are] shared equally by all members of society.”​[7]​ Public health laws such as compulsory vaccination or mandatory helmet laws are the embodiment of this principle. Public health law, according to the World Health Organization, broadly “includes laws that are intended as health interventions, laws that define the powers, duties and boundaries of health agencies and systems, and laws that have an impact on health but were not enacted with population health in mind.”​[8]​ Under this definition, public health laws are classified not just by their content, but also by their consequences. In practice, this means that while some laws may not have an expressly stated public health purpose, they might, nevertheless, have an intended or unintended public health effect. Legislative history is often useful in ascertaining the true purpose behind public health laws, which may not have a clearly articulated public health focus; in this way, legislative history offers a contemporaneous, stream-of-consciousness account of what went on behind the scenes of the law-making process. But, where legislative history is silent or otherwise unhelpful, other contextual factors must be considered. 
Ascertaining the purpose behind public health laws is more than pedagogical boondoggle; laws are only defensible as policy stances to the extent that they are justifiable. Laws that are either unaccountable to the constituency they serve or that do not respond to bona fide socio-legal concerns run the risk of vitiation by the judiciary. However, this check-and-balance response only works if litigants bring the law before a court of competent jurisdiction and (notwithstanding any sua sponte judicial overreach) assert a direct challenge the law’s validity or enforceability. Laws promulgated in the name of public health are no less beholden to this justificatory standard. There may, in fact, be legitimate arguments in favor holding these types of laws to an even higher standard. On one hand, if a law’s stated purpose is to serve public health needs that do not actually exist, then the law is (in some sense) worse than merely wasteful because public health laws are not innocuous—most mandate action in contravention of individual self-interest for the sake of the collective and some impose civil or criminal sanctions for failure to heed their directives.​[9]​ Beyond being unnecessary, frivolous laws may also sow discord in the public’s confidence of elected officials and thereby jeopardize the integrity of the legislative process. On the other hand, if a law purports to address a true public health need, but does so ineffectively, not only will the public health problem persist, and perhaps even become worse, but the onus will be on the public to challenge the law’s efficacy—a task that may be difficult or impossible with available data. Lawmakers who foist useless public health laws on a society in need of practical legislation are effectively shirking their representative duty to the constituency.
For the aforementioned reasons, legislative fiats are unacceptable in shaping issues of social responsibility.​[10]​ Stated otherwise: whim cannot be a valid basis for policy decisions in the realm of public health law. This paper contends that Good Samaritan legislation has not, heretofore, been the product of carefully considered public health policy and, as such, may not be achieving the legitimate public health needs they purport to address. To the extent that this paper is not the first to oar into the waters of Good Samaritan legislation,​[11]​ a brief discussion of the history behind Good Samaritan laws will be presented first. Following this summary is an overview of trends in this area of the law; this paper examines the public health utility and legal validity of these laws. Following this public health appraisal of Good Samaritan laws is a call to action that urges legislators to consider future Good Samaritan bills and to re-examine existing Good Samaritan legislation for consistency with public health objectives.​[12]​


2.	Overview of Good Samaritan Laws
News archives are replete with anecdotes of Good Samaritan benevolence.​[13]​ This is likely because these instances of altruism are exceptional for both their newsworthiness and praiseworthiness. Whether the helping hand comes from a passing physician, apocryphal Samarian, or modern-day NFL quarterback,​[14]​ Good Samaritans are those individuals that gratuitously render aid in a spontaneous emergency situation. This modern day allusion to “Good Samaritans” is as old as biblical times; in the New Testament, the Good Samaritan parable recounts the philanthropic impulses of a Samarian passerby who, finding a man lying wounded in the street, stopped to render aid.​[15]​ Had this Good Samaritan continued on his way, like the Levite and the priest before him, contemporary social mores would not likely have condemned his actions, either morally or legally. While such indifference to human suffering may seem reprehensible to modern sensibilities, this apathy was not altogether unconscionable throughout history. Early common law did not rebuke a “bad Samaritan” in circumstances analogous to Jesus’ parable; specifically, the common law punished murder with a death sentence but entirely excused “gentle murder”​[16]​ (i.e., failing to rescue).​[17]​ This rift begs the obvious question: why? 
Courts and legislators in common law countries were, apparently, unperturbed by this double standard. Although the taking of a life and the refusal to rescue an imperiled neighbor are both exercises of the will, the act of commission was universally punished at common law while the act of omission remained free from legal sanction.​[18]​ There is nothing talismanic about this calculus—the reluctance to impose a duty to rescue does not appear to have been the result of carefully considered policy and may actually have little to do with morality at all.​[19]​ Some commentators have expressed concern that, because of this poor policymaking, these types of laws are vague and may not be good law, a more detailed analysis of which is taken up infra.​[20]​ Because Good Samaritan statutes are seldom put on trial for their constitutional and legal validity, judicial waterproofing has not, heretofore, been an effective mechanism in obviating the need for reform.​[21]​ 
From the dawn of Good Samaritan legislation up until today, questions of propriety remain.​[22]​ While early legal scholars questioned whether these laws would even stay afloat in a sea of uncertainty,​[23]​ subsequent commentators, perhaps resigned to the fact that Good Samaritan laws were not just a legislative flash in the pan, adopted a different tone and instead questioned if lawmakers could strengthen future Good Samaritan legislation with the lessons learned from those laws already in effect.​[24]​ Public health practitioners have also not offered any detailed analysis of their own on Good Samaritan laws to date.​[25]​ This paper attempts to address this gap in the scholarship. In so doing, it will grapple with some of the fundamentals of Good Samaritanship: Who is considered a “Good Samaritan”? What are the limitations on statutory immunity? Are Good Samaritan laws even valid laws in the first place or are they unconstitutional?​[26]​ Just like the lawyer whose question prompted Jesus to impart the parable, this paper also seeks answers about modern day Good Samaritan law by critically examining this body of law through a lens not heretofore examined. 
3.	History of Good Samaritan Laws
To understand the strengths and shortcomings of current Good Samaritan laws, a brief review of their historical roots is illuminating. While evidence of the Good Samaritan mentality survives from ancient Egyptian and Indian law, a duty to assist did not show up in western civilization until the 19th century; and, even then, it was not until after World War II that new criminal codes began incorporating “failure-to-rescue” provisions with regularity.​[27]​ The adoption of Good Samaritan legislation took place predominantly in countries that did not share the Anglo-American legal tradition, called civil law countries.​[28]​ Common law countries, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States, with their emphasis on individual liberties, had traditionally shied away from imposing similar legal obligations on their citizenry.​[29]​ That is not to say that “forced civil duties” are unknown in the common law legal tradition.​[30]​ In the United States today, the law imposes a duty to rescue when a contract or special relationship exists, demands the forfeiture of money from individuals for the financial support of others (e.g., taxes for welfare programs), and requires jury duty service.​[31]​ While law typically both informs and is informed by social mores and cultural ethics, Good Samaritanism strikes a chord of disharmony; despite the existence of these analogous civic duties and despite the “widespread philosophical support for the idea that there is a moral requirement to aid those in peril”,​[32]​ the common law does not enforce any obligation to save one’s neighbor from peril. 
Accordingly, courts pandered to this “universally admitted moral duty to rescue a stranger from peril”​[33]​ by formulating their own Good Samaritan protections under the common law.​[34]​ But, up until the late 1950s, Good Samaritan statutes were virtually non-existent in the United States;​[35]​ in 1959 California’s Good Samaritan law became the archetype for the legislative tide that was to follow. Pioneering this new area of civil immunity, Section 2144 of California’s Business and Professional Code protected physicians who spontaneously came upon an accident and rendered aid.​[36]​ In the next five years, thirty-one states and Washington D.C. all enacted Good Samaritan statutes.​[37]​ Though the catalyst(s) behind this concerted action remain(s) unclear,​[38]​ the end result is unambiguous: all 51 U.S. jurisdictions​[39]​ have enacted some form of Good Samaritan legislation since 1959.​[40]​ 
In 1964, after a flurry of states had enacted Good Samaritan protections similar to California’s statute, the American Medical Association—presumed by some to be the impetus behind the new legislation—published a statement expressing their opinion that “such legislation is probably unnecessary.”​[41]​ Various law review articles published in the aftermath of the legislation articulated similar befuddlement: “the occasion is at hand to reconsider the need for, and the hopeless disarray of, [G]ood [S]amaritan laws . . . . The fear [that occasioned archetypical Good Samaritan legislation] was groundless . . . . and [the] resulting remedy seem[s] misplaced”​[42]​ decried one commentator, while another was more succinct: “such legislation . . . was provoked by unfounded anxiety.”​[43]​
To understand what led to this result, it is important to first take a step back and briefly revisit what prompted the original legislation. The legislative history for the measure is sparse. William Byron Rumford, a pharmacist turned politician, introduced Assembly Bill 2873 on June 3, 1959.​[44]​ With no apparent debate or eloquent soliloquy, the bill passed and became a short, one paragraph amendment to Section 2144 of California’s Business and Professions Code. Without legislative history as a guide, one commentator supposes that the catalytic event was an incident at Squaw Valley, a California ski resort, where off-duty physicians did not render aid to a fellow skier involved in an accident.​[45]​ Another commentator suggests, instead, that the raison d’être for the legislation “was [the] aftermath of a [court] case occurring in San Mateo, California.”​[46]​ Although it is nearly impossible to corroborate either of these accounts, other examples of legislative whim in the Good Samaritan realm lend anecdotal credence to their validity. Nebraska’s Good Samaritan law, for example, came about because a state lawmaker attending an informal dinner bumped into a physician who suggested the need for the law; the senator disagreed and promptly asked a urologist and an obstetrician if they would help at the scene of the accident without a law in place.​[47]​ One responded “Hell, no!” and the other said that, if he did, he would not tell the victim that he was a doctor.​[48]​ Shortly thereafter, Nebraska had a Good Samaritan law. 
Beyond these vignettes, there does not seem to be any empirical evidence supporting the need for such legislative overreach. Volumes I and II of Callaghan & Co.’s Current Municipal Problems provide a survey of problems faced by various state and local governments between 1959 and 1976. The editors of Current Municipal Problems did not reference an increase in traffic fatalities, poor road design, lack of physician philanthropy at the scenes of accidents, or any related phenomenon as recurrent problems during the heyday of Good Samaritan legislation. Case law, in the form of increased malpractice lawsuits, also did not support the legislation during that time span.​[49]​ In the absence of other data, anecdotes seem to be the only type of supporting evidence.​[50]​
There is something unsettling about this type of legislative whim. Evidence-based decision-making is what we should expect from our legislators in all laws—especially those affecting the public’s health. This kind of a priori legislation sets a dangerous precedent. Unfortunately, this is not the first time that legislation or judicial rulemaking occurred in the absence of empirical validity. In the latter part of the 20th century, fear of imprisoning an innocent man on the basis of a false rape claim led various lawmakers and courts to promulgate and enforce corroboration rules in several states. These rules required a victim​[51]​ alleging rape to offer evidence corroborating her story—a victim’s own testimony, in other words, was insufficient. This led to predictably low conviction rates in states with strict corroboration rules.​[52]​ Problematically, these corroboration warnings were based “on false beliefs about the untrustworthiness of women”​[53]​ for which “[t]here never was, of course, any evidence.”​[54]​ Thus, although “[e]mpirical . . . . risk of false charges of rape [against innocent men] tends to be less than for other crimes[,]”​[55]​ state legislatures and judges who supported corroboration requirements seemed indifferent to the realities of rape.
While the social and moral consequences of letting a rapist walk free are qualitatively different from immunizing the negligent acts of an otherwise philanthropic passerby, the legislative and judicial insouciance is the same. In both cases, it was the “emotional hook and intuitive appeal”​[56]​ of fear-based policy that wrought changes in the legal or evidentiary landscape. While corroboration requirements have since been scaled back or eliminated in all but a few jurisdictions,​[57]​ Good Samaritan laws remain firmly entrenched in every state code, often times in various iterations, despite limited empirical or anecdotal support for their existence.​[58]​
There was (and, to a large extent, remains)​[59]​ very little empirical evidence demonstrating the necessity or efficacy of Good Samaritan legislation.​[60]​ The protections offered by Good Samaritan statutes, originally intended solely for the indemnification of physicians who rendered spontaneous aid at the scene of an accident,​[61]​ were expanded by various legislatures in the years following their debut to offer immunity to other medical practitioners,​[62]​ non-medical individuals,​[63]​ and, eventually, to anyone.​[64]​ But even this expansion did not appreciably change the public health efficacy of the law. In the immediate aftermath of this expansion, it seemed like the Good Samaritan laws, as a whole, still had not achieved their objective, with at least one commentator noting that 
[M]any of the 109 Good Samaritan statutes effective today are so confusing and ambiguous that the people whom they are meant to protect either do not know that they are covered under a particular statute or cannot understand the extent of their protection. Consequently, the fear of an impending lawsuit still deters bystanders from offering help to an accident victim.​[65]​ 

At least anecdotally, therefore, these laws were not doing what they intended by the early 1980s—encouraging spontaneous emergency care.​[66]​
Unlike the prototype Good Samaritan laws of the mid-20th century, which seemingly responded to baseless practitioner fears of future lawsuits rather than actual trends in case law,​[67]​ the most recent wave of Good Samaritan-like laws has responded to the empirically verifiable opioid crisis.​[68]​ Good Samaritan laws indemnifying actors in for reporting opioid abuse, as long as they comply with the statutory requirements,​[69]​ demonstrate the how Good Samaritan protections continue to be used as legislative tools to encourage morally laudable behavior and achieve public health objectives.
4.	Methods
Good Samaritan laws come in all shapes and sizes. For the purposes of this analysis, laws considered “Good Samaritan laws” are only those laws meeting the same inclusion criteria as the Good Samaritan laws in the Emergency Law Inventory (“ELI”).​[70]​ ELI, created by the Center for Public Health Practice at the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public Health, is a public health informatics tool that surveys and summarizes emergency preparedness laws in the United States to help practitioners and laypersons alike understand how the law affects them during declared emergencies. Because ELI did not include laws that related exclusively to criminal liability,​[71]​ AEDs,​[72]​ epinephrine administration, or reporting laws​[73]​ nor does this analysis (except for comparative purposes). Good Samaritan laws for all 50 states, Washington, D.C., and the federal government were examined in the following analysis, while Good Samaritan laws of U.S. territories and non-U.S. jurisdictions were not (except for comparative purposes). These Good Samaritan laws were entered into a table by state and stratified by six different variables, as set out in the Appendix.
5.	Statutory Variability of Good Samaritan Laws
Good Samaritan laws are diverse; indeed, “variety is one of the few elements common to all [of them].”​[74]​ This variety is both a vice​[75]​ and a virtue.​[76]​ At least one commentator posited this lack of uniformity as an indication of the controversial undercurrents in this body of law.​[77]​ The true existence of controversy notwithstanding, this metric seems too blunt an instrument to assess popular opinion expressed as qualitative data and ignores the prerogative of legislatures to introduce their own syntactic spin on their own promulgations. Despite a uniformity of purpose, to wit: “encouraging prompt treatment of accident victims at the scene of [an] accident”,​[78]​ this freedom of choice has led, predictably, to an array of differing conceptualizations of Good Samaritanism.
The differences that define this area of the law are both in substance and in application. Substantively, these laws are characterized by six distinct categories​[79]​ (class of person protected, action covered, good faith state of mind, compensation arrangement, locations or situations to which the immunity applies, and circumstances that constitute forfeiture of immunity).​[80]​ The class of person protected category determines the applicability of the law. The following tables illustrate the variability of application in these laws based on the class of individual protected.

Table 1. Inter-jurisdictional trends regarding class of people covered
States	Profession for which the jurisdiction extends exclusive protections
Six jurisdictions (Alabama, Arkansas, California, Kansas, New Jersey, and Texas)	Nonmedical professionals (e.g., firefighters, law enforcement officials)
Twelve jurisdictions (California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Utah)	Physician Assistants
Five jurisdictions (Kentucky, Louisiana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Virginia)	Emergency medical response personnel
Eighteen jurisdictions (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas)	Veterinary professionals









Table 2. Volume of laws per profession






Emergency Medical Services Professional	77
Minor/Student	77








Good Samaritan protections, as a matter of legislative grace, are different across jurisdictions. Just over a third of all jurisdictions surveyed in ELI (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Guam, Idaho, the Marshall Islands, Montana, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, the Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio, Palau, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, the Virgin Islands, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming) have only one, all-encompassing Good Samaritan Statute while the jurisdiction with the most Good Samaritan laws, Illinois, has ten laws that specifically indemnify dentists, physical therapists, respiratory care practitioners, podiatrists, veterinarians and veterinary technicians, advanced practice nurses, physician assistants, physicians and chiropractors (and their internists), and optometrists all in separate, similarly-worded statutes. The states with the second- and third-most amount of Good Samaritan laws are New York (with eight) and California, Louisiana, and Rhode Island (each with six). While all 50 states and the District of Columbia have Good Samaritan laws, some U.S. territorial jurisdictions do not have any Good Samaritan legislation (American Samoa, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Puerto Rico). 
To the extent that most laws (Good Samaritan laws included) are the result of sophisticated legislative processes, influenced by various interest groups, lobbyists, and constituents, the exact impetus(es) behind the promulgation of these statutes cannot be easily deciphered; there may not be a nexus, at all, between jurisprudential action and legislative reaction. In the Good Samaritan realm, the sheer number of Good Samaritan statutes in a particular jurisdiction offers very little insight into the statistical realities of case law (i.e., the actual volume of malpractice lawsuits levied against physician Samaritans) or frequency of individuals rendering gratuitous aid in emergencies. Thus, the repertoire of Good Samaritan laws in Illinois, for example, does not reveal much about whether unusual instances of altruistic roadside assistance by podiatrists during nuclear attacks triggered the legislation.​[82]​
5.2.	Syntactic Differences
Examining the syntax of the Good Samaritan laws for legal substance reveals other trends relative to the “degree of protection afforded.”​[83]​ Out of 154 total Good Samaritan laws contained in the ELI database, thirty-seven laws (or less than a third) included all six​[84]​ categories that characterize a typical Good Samaritan law​[85]​ (action covered, good faith state of mind, compensation arrangement, locations or situations to which the immunity applies, circumstances that constitute forfeiture of immunity). The Good Samaritan law with the least amount of these typical provisions, containing only two out of six, is Michigan’s law, MCLS § 333.18826, which protects veterinarians from rendering emergency aid or performing euthanasia, without specifying any remunerative, standard of care, locational/situational, or good faith requirements. But this is not as problematic as it may appear on its face; courts faced with this type of question would not likely “run afoul of the public policy against wanton and reckless acts when interpreting [a] Good Samaritan statute[ ] which [is] silent on [the good faith requirement.]”​[86]​
5.3.	Good Faith, Damages, LocationAL, and Remuneration Differences 
Examining other categories reveal different patterns. A strong majority of Good Samaritan laws explicitly indemnify the actor from civil damages resulting from her conduct (145 out of 154). Forty-nine out of 154 do not specify whether remuneration received as consideration for emergency services rendered would defeat the Good Samaritan immunity.​[87]​ Forty-five out of 154 do not specify whether the absence of good faith would defeat immunity (and only one state, Pennsylvania, defines what constitutes “good faith” within the statute​[88]​). Thirty-seven out of 154 do not elaborate on a standard of care the failed observance of which would disentitle the actor to immunity. And another thirty-seven out of 154 do not enumerate any specific locational/situational limitations that might defeat the immunity protections. 
The location where emergency care is rendered can be essential in determining whether or not Good Samaritan protection inheres. Fifteen jurisdictions​[89]​ (twenty-five percent) explicitly exclude emergency care provided at a medical facility from Good Samaritan immunity, while five jurisdictions​[90]​ (eight percent) explicitly include emergency care provided at a medical facility under Good Samaritan immunity. Five jurisdictions exclude emergency care provided at person’s place of employment from Good Samaritan immunity. Delaware and Rhode Island, included in these totals, hold that care provided either at the place of employment or at a health care facility does not qualify for Good Samaritan protection. Virginia and Oklahoma take a less restricted approach and grant the actor immunity “wherever” and “anywhere” the Good Samaritan care is rendered, respectively. The remainder of jurisdictions, thirty-four (or fifty-seven percent), either only require the care to be provided at the scene of an accident or emergency (or some variation therein) or are silent on the issue altogether.
5.4.	Residual Peculiarities
There are other differences among these laws that do not fit neatly into categories. Like other vague statutes and regulations, the more categories that a Good Samaritan law omits, the more the judiciary has to engage in creative interpretation if a litigant ever challenges the statute. In addition to Nebraska’s “disturbing” law, which “requires neither a standard of care nor good faith”,​[91]​ statutes in Louisiana,​[92]​ Michigan,​[93]​ and Wisconsin​[94]​ also coincidentally lack these key categories, thereby seemingly providing immunity to actors who act in the absence of good faith and without a standard of care. This means that the actor could conceivably commit acts of recklessness, gross negligence, or even willful misconduct, such as providing care while drunk,​[95]​ and would still be protected by the law.​[96]​ A few commentators argue that this sets a standard that resembles a license more than a statutory grant of immunity.​[97]​
Some Good Samaritan legislation is qualitatively different from the rest, in both the spirit and letter of the law. Wisconsin, Vermont, and Minnesota Good Samaritan statutes impose a duty to rescue, the implications of which raise various potential constitutional concerns and enforcement issues.​[98]​ Failure to provide “reasonable assistance” in these states exposes the unwitting Samaritan to punishments ranging from a $100 fine​[99]​ to a misdemeanor charge.​[100]​ A more detailed discussion of these is taken up in Section 7, infra.
Interestingly, there is also significant intra-jurisdictional variation in Good Samaritan legislation. In Kanas, for example, a veterinarian who renders emergency care to a human can seemingly request a fee for her emergency services without jeopardizing her immunity,​[101]​ while the very next sub-section of the statute indicates that she would seemingly lose her Good Samaritan protection if she demanded the same following emergency care rendered to an animal.​[102]​ Or in Louisiana where the Good Samaritan statute, as amended,​[103]​ seemingly permits emergency medical services personnel, dentists, and veterinarians to engage in the provision of legally reckless care at the scene of an emergency while this same type of incompetence at the scene of an emergency constitutes forfeiture of Good Samaritan protection for a physician, physician assistant, surgeon, nurse, or “other member of the medical profession.”​[104]​ In Texas, the remuneration issue constitutes grounds for immunity forfeiture in one section but is entirely irrelevant for the same consideration in the very next code section: individuals rendering emergency care as “unlicensed medical personnel” (a term not defined by the statute) are entitled to immunity even if they charge a fee for their services,​[105]​ while the antecedent code section bars immunity for “any person” who renders emergency care for a fee or the expectation of one.​[106]​ This is all the more remarkable because both code sections were enacted in the same year. The law in New Jersey makes a similar distinction in a pair of statutes enacted seven years apart; while a firefighter can render aid either voluntarily or for a fee,​[107]​ a physician assistant risks losing her immunity if she charges a fee for whatever care she provides at the scene of an emergency.​[108]​ And, in Illinois, a licensed nurse is eligible for Good Samaritan protection if she renders emergency care without regard to the location or situation,​[109]​ while a licensed podiatrist is only eligible for Good Samaritan protection if she renders emergency care either at the scene of an accident or during a nuclear attack.​[110]​ Even if there are colorable justifications for these types of differences, the point is that the differences (even within the same statute) undermine the ultimate intent of these laws to clarify legal repercussions and thereby encourage more spontaneous emergency care. This analysis reveals that Good Samaritan legislation is neither uniform across or within jurisdictions. 
Given the lack of predictability, it is little wonder why Good Samaritan laws remain problematic. While one of the main purposes of the legislation was to “remov[e] barriers to immediate emergency care[,]”​[111]​ the “fragmented”​[112]​ nature of Good Samaritan legislation has seemingly achieved the opposite of what was intended—it has created a barrier that “threatens to prevent the very rescues that [it] intended to encourage.”​[113]​ 


6.	Pennsylvania: A Case Study
The earliest recognition​[114]​ of the Good Samaritan paradigm in Pennsylvanian jurisprudence is an 1852 case from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In Lyon v. Hampton, the court stated: 
[This court] can readily appreciate the feeling which may lead a kind but inconsiderate man to extend a helping hand to one in embarrassed circumstances, without reflecting upon all the consequences of his acts. But when his benevolence operates injuriously upon the rights of others, it is a plain principle of justice that he should furnish an indemnity. The good Samaritan would have received but small commendation if he had relieved the suffering traveller with wine and oil and money which had been unjustly taken from another.​[115]​ 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s conceptualization of Good Samaritanism evinces the salient features of the common law’s Good Samaritan definition—summarized here by the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if: (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.​[116]​

It is, thus, self-evident that Good Samaritanship is firmly stitched into the legal traditions of both common law and civil law countries. In Pennsylvania, as in other jurisdictions, the legal protections enjoyed by Good Samaritans before California catalyzed the Good Samaritan renaissance were the product of judicial activism rather than legislative zeitgeist. 
At the same time that other states were adopting Good Samaritan legislation, Pennsylvania considered its first Good Samaritan bill. One commentator posits that, during the legislature’s 1963–64 sessions, these efforts stalled and that this first bill did not survive.​[117]​ While this contention remains unsupported in the official indices of House and Senate history for that time period, there is evidence that another bill (Senate Bill 511) did exist and became the state’s first Good Samaritan law. Originally codified at 12 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 1641 – 42 (1963), this bill, which has since been repealed,​[118]​ won unanimous approval in both the House and the Senate after only two substantive edits to the original bill.​[119]​ 
More than a decade later, Pennsylvania considered a layperson Good Samaritan law as a part of a large-scale judicial codification effort. In March 1976, the Pennsylvania legislature first considered Senate Bill 935 (codified at 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8332), which had taken roughly nine years to draft.​[120]​ The legislative history for the bill is remarkably sparse, offering insight only into the legislature’s concern that codification might be a Trojan horse for judicial aggrandizement.​[121]​ The bill enjoyed final passage, on third reconsideration, by a more contentious vote of 37 to 10 in the Senate and 135 to 46 in the House.​[122]​ 
Six years later, the legislature revisited the Good Samaritan issue relating to veterinarians in House Bill 1458 (codified at 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8331.1); the absence of any discussion or dissent was even more apparent than the prior Good Samaritan bill. The legislature passed the House Bill 1458 on third consideration by a vote of 48 to 0 in the Senate and 194 to 0 in the House.​[123]​ 
More than three decades later, in the grip of a pharmacological epidemic, the Pennsylvania legislature considered Senate Bill 1164 (codified at 35 P.S. § 780-113.8), with the intent to “provid[e] for drug overdose response immunity.”​[124]​ As with the state’s first Good Samaritan bill and subsequent veterinarian Good Samaritan bill, the legislature unanimously passed the overdose immunity bill by votes of 50 to 0 in the Senate and 194 to 0 in the House.​[125]​ Part of the rationale behind this piece of legislation was the fact that “[o]pioid overdose is particularly amenable to intervention because death typically occurs more than an hour after the onset of an overdose, allowing time for resuscitation.”​[126]​ One of the principal reasons that opioid overdose is particularly amenable to legislative intervention is because of the quantity and quality of data on the subject, which helps reveal the true contours of the problem. Armed with an understanding of magnitude and severity, legislators can craft a more appropriate remedy. In the case of opioid overdose, surveys have indicated that the “fear of police response [is] the most common barrier to not calling 911 during overdoses.”​[127]​ This reluctance to call 911 is an obstacle in reaching the public health goal of encouraging rapid treatment for individuals who have overdosed. In the eyes of Pennsylvania legislators, this barrier seemed increasingly important when they began considering Senate Bill 1164; between 2000 and 2014, opioid abuse mortality spiked by 200 percent across the country​[128]​ and, in Pennsylvania, the problem seemed just as grim. In the year preceding enactment of Senate Bill 1164, the state coroner’s office reported that the state’s 2,488 deaths amounted to the equivalent of seven people dying every day from a drug overdose.​[129]​ 
To combat the growing public crisis, Pennsylvanian legislators, like other state legislators, sought an evidence-based policy response. Instead of myopically grasping for an untested remedy, legislators in other states had looked at the success of alcohol Good Samaritan policies at colleges and had crafted their laws accordingly.​[130]​ Pennsylvania, with the luxury of being a little behind the Eight Ball,​[131]​ was able to consider other data. Senate Bill 1164 “follow[ed] closely on the heels of the Center for Rural Pennsylvania’s report on heroin and opioid drug overdoses and abuse.”​[132]​ Senate Bill 1164 was a “model” public health law​[133]​ because it enjoyed widespread support from a variety of state professional organizations​[134]​ and it was informed by a wealth of both empirical​[135]​ and anecdotal​[136]​ data.
The legislative history of Senate Bill 1164 elucidates what we should expect from our legislature in public health lawmaking. One of the bill sponsors, Senator Pileggi, introduced the purpose of the bill as follows: 
Every area of Pennsylvania has seen the tragic impact of the heroin crisis . . . . I am grateful to those who have shared their stories of personal tragedy with me . . . . [the aunt of a youth who died of a drug overdose] was the first to talk to me about this[sic] very personal impact that a bill like this could have. [She] is here today . . . .​[137]​ 

This pathos approach is a bedrock principle of advocacy, but it must be mediated by the other Aristotelian values: logos and ethos. Workable public health policies are invariably some combination of “science and art”​[138]​ and represent a delicate balance between the collective wellbeing and private or public rights. As such, the enactment of these overdose Good Samaritan laws should be the result of carefully considered policy​[139]​ rather than the product of emotive legislative fiat. In promulgating 35 P.S. § 780-113.8, the Pennsylvania legislature consulted the data underpinning the empirical reality (logos), shared emotionally powerful vignettes (pathos), and acknowledged analogous legislative action in other states (ethos). The importance of this evidence-based approach is taken up in more detail in Section 8, infra.
If the Pennsylvania experience is any indication, Good Samaritan laws are not contentious in legislative chambers, but this majoritarian approbation should not be misconstrued as a proxy for legal validity or public health efficacy. State judiciaries, in their function as a check-and-balance to state legislatures, appear loath to strike down these laws, sua sponte—and it seems litigants are not beseeching the courts to go so far.​[140]​ As such, the importance of making good laws in the first place (so that they do not require subsequent judicial restructuring) cannot be overstated. 

7.	The Duty to Assist
Understanding the duty to assist as a public health alternative to traditional Good Samaritan immunity protections illustrates the difficulties legislatures face when enacting laws without evidence-based justification. As noted earlier, Minnesota, Vermont, and Wisconsin impose an affirmative statutory duty to come to the aid of someone known to be in danger. Philosophically, morally, and pragmatically these “duty to rescue” laws occupy a different and more problematic echelon of the Good Samaritan paradigm. Historically, this type of “duty to assist” law, which easily predates scriptural yore,​[141]​ enjoys an even older tradition than typical Good Samaritan laws. But this rich history says nothing about their propriety as public health laws in the 21st century. 
From a theoretical perspective, these laws seem to conflict with the fundamental value of individual liberty. While the state can exercise its police powers in the name of public health,​[142]​ the state cannot simply trample on individual rights with impunity. Commentators insist that “all non-contractual positive duties the state imposes are illegitimate” and that “the duty to rescue is a type of forced altruism and . . . forced altruism is wrong.”​[143]​ In sum, these types of Good Samaritan laws “impose[ ] an undue burden on individual liberty.”​[144]​ Despite these concerns, courts have not struck them down when given the chance. 
Wisconsin’s statute,​[145]​ which imposes a duty to act when an individual knows of a crime being committed, is outside of the purview of this paper,​[146]​ but its judicial treatment is exemplary of how other Good Samaritan laws might fare if challenged. In 1994, this statute came under constitutional challenge for the first and only time in its 35-year history.​[147]​ In State v. LaPlante,​[148]​ the Wisconsin Court of Appeals both upheld the appellant’s conviction under and constitutionality of Wis. Stat § 940.34. More than 20 years later, Wisconsin’s Good Samaritan law “remains largely unused.”​[149]​
In Vermont, the trend is similar. Since the promulgation of Vermont’s duty to rescue statute, 12 V.S.A. § 519,​[150]​ the statute has only been cited in eight judicial opinions in the last 50 years.	The same is true in Minnesota; although 35 years have passed since the Minnesota legislature promulgated its own Good Samaritan law, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01,​[151]​ there has not been a single prosecution under the statute.​[152]​ The 2002 Swenson v. Waseca Mutual Insurance​[153]​ decision is Minnesota’s answer to Wisconsin’s LaPlante decision; just like its eastern neighbor, the Swenson decision is revelatory of judicial tendencies in Good Samaritan statutory interpretation. In Swenson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals wrestled with the novel issue of whether Good Samaritan protections inure to one who provides transportation from the scene of an emergency in Minnesota. Ruling in the affirmative, the court broadly construed the statutory language “during transit” as “provid[ing] a liability shield to laypersons whose only act of assistance is to drive a person from the scene of an emergency to a health-care facility.”​[154]​ The court cited the legislature’s public health motivations in promulgating the statute as justification for the court’s expansive interpretation.​[155]​
The duty to aid is not confined to these states, however; it also comes up in the maritime context. In 1913, only ten months after the sinking of the RMS TITANIC, President William Taft made the United States a signatory country under the International Salvage Convention.​[156]​ This international agreement stipulated, in relevant part: “Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel, her crew, and passengers, to render assistance to everybody, even though an enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost.”​[157]​ Accordingly, the United States Congress enacted 46 U.S.C. § 728 (amended as 46 U.S.C. § 2304) which held: “A master or individual in charge of a vessel shall render assistance to any individual found at sea in danger of being lost, so far as the master or individual in charge can do so without serious danger to the master's or individual's vessel or individuals on board.”​[158]​ Failure to render aid could result in a fine and/or jail time.​[159]​ At the ripe old age of 105, this is the United States’ oldest Good Samaritan law. Despite the law’s longevity, a couple things remain unclear: how many would-be Levites became Samaritans out of fear of legal sanctions and, perhaps more importantly, do “individuals in charge of vessels” today even know of the law’s existence? Like its land-based counterparts, this Good Samaritan law has also not yet faced judicial scrutiny.​[160]​
Though the practical burdens of enforcement make the aforementioned results not altogether surprising,​[161]​ the question remains: should public health laws that are either seldom used or selectively enforced exist at all? At least one scholar contends that Good Samaritan laws remain necessary as long as we live in an imperfectly moral society.​[162]​ Even if these laws remain “largely dormant”​[163]​ and, thus, “punish nothing”​[164]​ they may still have utility of a higher calling as “instrument[s] of moral guidance . . . .”​[165]​ This moral guidance, nevertheless, runs the risk of being little more than a legislative pacifier if it is ignored or forgotten by the society that it was intended to serve. 
All of this, of course, is to say nothing of the public health impact of these laws. The threat of punishment for failure to observe a statutory duty to assist mimics the deterrent rationale inherent in criminal statutes. In both circumstances, there is a similar conundrum of proof (i.e., if the law actually achieves its intended effect of deterring the proscribed behavior). Whether a deterrent effect has encouraged more Good Samaritans to assist those in peril or whether it simply amounts to “ineffective symbolism”​[166]​ is a question not easily answered by any single source of available data. The call to action for these duty to assist laws is, therefore, no different than the broader call to action for all Good Samaritan legislation; these laws, like all legislative actions, should be informed by data, not by whim.
8.	Have Good Samaritan laws achieved their purpose?
With the knowledge that “public health policy, in the form of laws . . . has a profound effect on health status”​[167]​, the goal of Good Samaritan laws focuses on the “promotion of public health and human life.”​[168]​ To achieve this goal, however, Good Samaritan laws operate in derogation of common law rights;​[169]​ the immunity protections afforded by original Good Samaritan legislation abrogate the legal redress traditionally available through a tort conduit for injured plaintiffs​[170]​ and, in the case of overdose Good Samaritan laws, the immunity protections override the public interest in criminal justice. In order to achieve their public health purpose, Good Samaritan statutes must be said to have a greater “beneficial effect” on the “public[’s] interest” than “detrimental effect upon individual [or public] rights.”​[171]​ This relationship is a key litmus test in determining whether Good Samaritan laws are worthwhile public health policy.
In the early years of Good Samaritan law, it seemed like they had not achieved their objective, with at least one commentator noting that 
[M]any of the 109 Good Samaritan statutes effective today are so confusing and ambiguous that the people whom they are meant to protect either do not know that they are covered under a particular statute or cannot understand the extent of their protection. Consequently, the fear of an impending lawsuit still deters bystanders from offering help to an accident victim.​[172]​ 
At least anecdotally, therefore, these laws were not doing what they intended by the early 1980s—encouraging spontaneous emergency care.​[173]​ This leaves us with the question of whether these laws have yet succeeded in achieving their underlying public health purpose in the intervening 30 years.
One way of framing this legal epidemiology issue is to ask a more specific question: has Good Samaritan legislation appreciably changed hearts and minds of would-be Samaritans by encouraging more spontaneous care? In other words, the operative question is whether the existence of Good Samaritan laws has encouraged individuals to stop and render aid when they might otherwise not have. Based on how the issue is framed, we might also ask an alternative question with equally weighty public health implications: have these laws sufficiently assuaged the remnant qualms of physicians and other medical professionals in emergency care situations?
Answering these questions is difficult, irrespective of how the issue is framed because there is currently no reliable source of data to use for evaluating state Good Samaritan laws. Compiling and analyzing data on laws like these is more than academic frivolity; “[d]ocumenting the effects of implemented policies (policy outcome) is equally important [to a policy’s actual content] in supporting evidence-based policy.”​[174]​ To this end, the federal enactment of an aviation Good Samaritan statute is instructive. Although commercial airlines in the United States were not required to report in-flight medical emergencies at the time the legislation was being considered, there was a wealth of data available “from multiple [public and private] sources . . . .”​[175]​ One source, a study by the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) Civil Aeromedical Institute, determined that in-flight medical emergencies had doubled between 1990 and 1993.​[176]​ Another source indicated that “CPR related incidents on board aircraft [had] almost tripled” between 1990 and 1996.​[177]​ In response, Congress enacted the Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998 (“AMAA”)​[178]​ to ensure limited liability for medically trained personnel who responded to in-flight emergencies on commercial airlines registered in the United States.​[179]​ The legislation also “require[d] major airlines to report their on-board medical incidents to the FAA.”​[180]​ This mandate to record the incidence of in-flight medical emergencies in regular reports​[181]​ would allow public health policy analysts to perform a comparative appraisal (albeit rudimentary) on in-flight data in years before and after the enactment of AMAA. 
But a genuine empirical appraisal of a law’s effectiveness is typically not so easy. In the absence of information compiled by a government agency or other organization, it is not clear what metric should be utilized in evaluating whether a law is doing what it should; in the case of Good Samaritan laws, is the appropriate measurement a reduction in fatal motor vehicle accidents? Decreased lengths of stay at hospitals following trauma? Decreased long-term morbidity from accidental injuries? The truth is that all of these metrics suffer from confounding, bias, and effect modification. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that not all emergency situations involving Good Samaritan behavior are motor vehicle accidents (although some state legislation is written to only cover such instances).​[182]​ 
But this challenge is not unique to the Good Samaritan realm—it plagues the broad swath of laws aimed at regulating behavior under the auspices of health promotion. While law is indispensible in achieving improved population-level wellbeing, “the study of the impact of laws and legal practices on health (‘public health law research’) has been . . . . almost entirely neglected.”​[183]​ The reasons behind this apparent dearth of research on the impact of public health laws are essential in understanding what makes Good Samaritan laws difficult to evaluate. 
Evaluating some of the effects of laws (whether intended or unintended) has been the province of the nascent field of “legal etiology”​[184]​ in public health practice. Laws that most readily lend themselves to evaluation are interventional health laws. It is no accident that these laws are well known in popular culture (e.g., laws that regulate cigarette smoking, seatbelt laws, helmet laws) because so much money and publicity is invested in the lobbying efforts, promulgation, and evaluation of theses types of laws. When a legislature considers a baseline set of empirical values as justification for adopting a policy, it creates a benchmark against which policy analysts, lawmakers, and public health practitioners can subsequently gauge improvement. In essence, a legislature’s intentional reliance on a particular set or source of data leads to the creation of a niche public health surveillance system, which can later be used to evaluate the public health efficacy of the law. The breed of Good Samaritan legislation enacted in response to the nation’s growing opioid crisis seems to fall into this category of public health laws. As alluded to in Section V, supra, the wealth of data behind overdose Good Samaritan laws indicates that they may be amenable to a genuine empirical reappraisal at various intervals following their enactment. Legislatures could, for example, use morbidity and mortality data following the enactment of an overdose Good Samaritan law and cross reference it with appropriate drug-related crime data to determine whether the suppression of the public’s interest in criminal justice could be justified by a net positive public health effect. Without these types of benchmarks, legislatures can become complacent with the current state of the law and, on the basis of longevity alone, take the efficacy of unappraised statutes for granted.​[185]​ 
Other types of public health laws, such as traditional Good Samaritan laws, are not as easily evaluated. The effect of these other types of public health laws can be difficult to gauge because the paucity of public interest in them. Only laws that enjoy a certain level of public interest are deemed to be “model public health laws.”​[186]​ Thus, the “lack of human and monetary resources”​[187]​ supporting research into these lower echelon public health laws has left legislators and public health practitioners without any genuine examination of their “legal effect.”​[188]​ The principal way of measuring this legal effect is by reference to the original intent of the legislature. This legislative intent is most reliably inferred from the floor debate, accepted/rejected amendments, and committee reports that comprise legislative history. Without adequate legislative history, the legal effect can be especially difficult to measure; in these cases, the public is just supposed to take it on faith that these laws are useful or, at the bare minimum, not harmful. Unfortunately, if the Pennsylvania experience is any indication, it seems that traditional Good Samaritan laws might not contain detailed legislative histories.​[189]​ This absence of legislative history further muddies an already murky area of the law and forces any attempt at Good Samaritan policy analysis to look for other data sources.
While crash statistics, mortality figures, and data collected by the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, for example, might provide some insight to the relative effects of these laws, they are only part of the equation. Law Professor Scott Burris, author of “Public Health Law Monitoring in a Big Data Future”, advocates for the use of “big data” in measuring legal effect.​[190]​ The largest obstacle to “scientifically reliable legal datasets” is the lack of any “shared standards cutting across topical silos.”​[191]​ While scientists and legal minds have collaborated to create a “compendium” of anti-smoking laws and public health outcome datasets to evaluate their efficacy,​[192]​ this integration effort (decades in the making)​[193]​ has not been replicated in other areas of the law. Using the LawAtlas platform, Professor Burris and his colleagues looked at distracted driving laws across 39 states and “created an interactive public portal where [they] could publish [their] data” (not too unlike ELI); this type of “health policy surveillance . . . satisfie[d] two basic conditions for the effective use of law and law reform to improve health: the creation of data for evaluation, and the rapid dissemination of health policy activities to speed the diffusion of innovation.”​[194]​ But this project, like ELI,​[195]​ only codified the laws and did not evaluate them. 
While simple mapping studies like this cannot integrate efficiency metrics, it is possible to leverage behavioral analytic dynamics to evaluate and compare laws. The Public Health Dynamics Lab and Center for Public Health Practice at the University of Pittsburgh are, as of the time of this writing, working collaboratively on a template for a large scale, agent based model that would allow future legal epidemiologists to compare state laws by transforming qualitative data into quantitative data. While this new development gestates, legal effect can be approximated using blunter instruments such as non-numeric qualitative data;​[196]​ this type of data includes “attitudes, behaviors, and environmental changes . . . .”​[197]​
Examining attitudes and knowledge of a health promoting law can give insight into its practical efficacy as public health intervention. Caleb Banta-Green and colleagues distributed surveys to police officers in Washington state in 2011, one year after the state legislature passed its overdose Good Samaritan law, in an attempt to assess their “knowledge of the law and level of support for and opinions of each provision of the law.”​[198]​ This was an important evaluative tool because previous studies had indicated that law enforcement officers are “sometimes under-informed, and often ambivalent to public health laws” despite the fact that they are “key stakeholders in building a comprehensive [public health] response.”​[199]​ In the Banta-Green study, 258 police officers were given in-person structured surveys aimed at gauging their understanding and attitudes of the law.​[200]​ Only one percent of those surveyed felt that the police department provided adequate guidance about the law’s tenets.​[201]​ Even once informed about the law’s provisions, 62 percent of respondents indicated that the law’s existence would not change their decision to make an arrest at the scene of an overdose because they would not have arrested anyone regardless.​[202]​ These figures “underscore the critical role of policy evaluation to evidence-based tailoring of public health laws in order to guarantee their positive impact.”​[203]​
Another issue that obfuscates the correlation between lawmaking and public health efficacy is legislative overreach in drafting Good Samaritan statutes. Legal scholars have expressed disagreement over whether a remuneration prohibition is warranted in light of the overall intent of Good Samaritan legislation; stated another way: “the purpose of the legislation is to obtain medical care for the injured, not to set up ethical standards for those acting under its aegis.”​[204]​ So “[i]f the purpose of Good Samaritan laws is to persuade physicians to stop and give help, why forbid them to receive their fee if the accident victim can afford to pay?”​[205]​ In this sense, legislators demand that all Samaritans be ‘Great’ Samaritans.​[206]​ In the absence of legislative history indicating the necessity of this gratuity provision, it can only be assumed that there is no evidence-based justification for its inclusion in the law. These whimsical inclusions in Good Samaritan statutes exacerbate the difficulty in evaluating them.
On balance, Good Samaritan laws have likely not achieved their public health objectives. In Pennsylvania, Good Samaritan statutes predating the state’s 2014 overdose Good Samaritan statute do not appear to have been supported by any evidence-based data. If the Pennsylvania experience is any guide, legislators, data analysts, and legal epidemiologists face an uphill battle in determining the legal effect of Good Samaritan statutes; without clear legislative reliance on empirical (or even anecdotal) data in the initial bill drafting, there is no fair standard by which to judge the efficacy of the subsequent law. The paucity of judicial treatment, general knowledge of the law’s existence, or low levels of prosecution or enforcement are all imperfect metrics for an a posteriori evaluation of legal effect. Yet, despite the controversy, these laws remain on the books, leaving the individuals who become victims of negligent malfeasance at the hands of Good Samaritans with no legal right of redress. In short, it does not seem that most Good Samaritan laws have achieved their public health purpose or, if they have, it is impossible to measure with available data.
9.	How do we make better Good Samaritan laws?
In concluding that Good Samaritan laws may not have achieved their intended purpose, we must both ask ‘why not’ and ‘what can be done to change that.’ To address these questions, it is important to first recognize the knowable and unknowable variables. For starters, “it is impossible to say whether Good Samaritan legislation has indeed increased bystander participation”​[207]​ because “[t]here are no available data for how often a Good Samaritan aids someone in distress.”​[208]​ As such, our empirical basis must be approximated by aggregating and comparing other data, to the extent feasible. Where precise statistics and figures are not available, educated inferences may be the most reliable alternative. It seems reasonable to assume, for example, that “our accelerated, mechanized era has created a genuine need for [some type of emergency care legislation].”​[209]​ Various data support this presupposition. In 2016, the latest year for which NHTSA has compiled motor vehicle crash data, there were nearly 38,000 motor vehicle-related deaths, representing a 5.6 percent increase from 2015.​[210]​ In 2016, the Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) published a report analyzing U.S. crash statistics from 2000 and 2013, which revealed that the United States had the highest rate of crash deaths in the developed world over that 13-year span (averaging 10.3 fatalities per 100,000 people).​[211]​ Combining the growing U.S. population​[212]​ with the steady increase in vehicle miles traveled on U.S. roads,​[213]​ leads to a near statistical inevitability of increased traffic fatality rates. In the case of traffic fatalities, the need for some kind of improvement is not in dispute; the only remaining thing in question is “whether such improvement should ultimately take the form of a Good Samaritan statute.”​[214]​ After all, “sometimes what it is politically expedient is only marginally effective.”​[215]​
Pace some commentators, there is no direct correlation between the efficacy of laws and how often they are “used.”​[216]​ The purpose of Good Samaritan laws is to encourage spontaneous assistance in emergency situations, not to discourage victims from suing Good Samaritans; therefore, measuring the value or utility of a Good Samaritan law by how often it is used in case law is inapposite. There may, however, be an argument that laws not often visited by courts, commentators, and the legislature are manifestly unnecessary. Yet, in almost all states, vestiges of formerly-useful-but-now-frivolous laws remain on the books.​[217]​ For some of these state laws, this rationale offers a cogent and defensible basis for vitiation, but an analogous changed conditions doctrine rationale for abolishing Good Samaritan laws, by sole virtue of their litigious rarity, is untenable. The use of Good Samaritan protections in opioid overdose legislation indicates that state lawmakers do not perceive the Good Samaritan paradigm as a legal anachronism. It, thus, behooves these legislatures to critically re-examine the need for and appropriateness of Good Samaritan legislation. This process can only take form once legislatures responsibly and intentionally seek evidence-informed bases as justifications for their legislative actions. Without evidence, legislatures become mired in the “difficulties [involved] in . . . evaluating policies . . . .” This, predictably, “can lead to policy stalemate, which often leads to deference to the status quo.”​[218]​ In the absence of “adequate data, [therefore,] policy makers cannot make informed judgments about the need for, or importance of, legislation.”​[219]​ 
This is not the first (and likely not the last) meta-analysis to conclude that better lawmaking is necessary to effectuate the true public health intent behind Good Samaritan laws. But while other commentators have lobbied for linguistic uniformity as the panacea,​[220]​ this paper urges greater accountability in the legislative process as a prerequisite to uniformity; to achieve more informative laws, lawmakers should rely on empirically verifiable bases, whenever possible. The actual drafting language is necessarily dependent on the foundational validity of the statute itself; stated differently, if there is a sound basis that relies on real-world data on which to predicate a legal duty or immunity, legislators will be more capable of precisely articulating the statutory nuance. As part of this methodological change, this paper posits that state legislatures should convene committees or other congressionally directed research bodies to empirically assess the current state of existing Good Samaritan legislation.​[221]​ 
This evaluation and modification is an important stage in public health policy analysis because “perfection eludes policymakers in the formulation and implementation phases.”​[222]​ Revisiting older, seldom used statutes, like Good Samaritan laws, is even more important because “[e]ven policy decisions that are correct when they are made must adjust to accommodate changing circumstances.”​[223]​ One model for this type of public health policy analysis is the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. This organization monitors the performance of implemented policies and supports ongoing evaluation efforts at the federal level.​[224]​ Another model that states could follow is the “health in all policies” (“HiAP”) initiative.​[225]​ This initiative recognizes the public health impact of governmental undertakings and consequently “improves the accountability of policymakers for [the] health impacts”​[226]​ of laws and policies that they enact. California, the first state to promulgate a Good Samaritan law in 1959, was also the first state to establish a HiAP Task Force in 2010. This task force provides a venue for the collaboration of various state agencies by encouraging these agencies to examine the interconnectedness of all policies in addressing public health issues.​[227]​ 
The due process and constitutional concerns that continue to haunt judicially-evasive Good Samaritan laws make the need for legislative reform all the more urgent. As mentioned above, Good Samaritan laws essentially preclude a common law right of action against a tortfeasor or override a public interest in the retributive justice that would otherwise be levied against a criminal.​[228]​ Because the law subjugates the purportedly lesser interests of individual plaintiffs and criminal justice policy to the supposedly greater interests of public health, the equivalency calculus must weigh in favor of the public health interests in order to be a valid exercise of legislative will.​[229]​ Thus, to the extent that Good Samaritan laws have “probably not achieved [their] purpose,”​[230]​ they are invalid. While a showing of invalidity does not betoken illegality, it is probative of a legislative inefficacy. The antidote for the maladies plaguing this body of public health law is simple: more informed lawmaking. Data-driven dialogue should be the basis for legislating issues of social responsibility, such as Good Samaritan laws. By relying on an equal balance of logos, pathos, and ethos, legislatures can promote public wellbeing while ensuring fair treatment of both individual rights and public interests, which will effectively eliminate whim as an acceptable basis for policy decisions in public health law. 
10.	Conclusion
A couple final points warrant addressing. First, as submitted earlier, Good Samaritan laws lack uniformity. In all but their most fundamental aspects,​[231]​ Good Samaritan laws provide varying degrees of protection in an increasingly diverse array of circumstances. Despite their differences, Good Samaritan laws, as a whole, are not going away. In 1998, a legal scholar questioned the need for additional Good Samaritan legislation, opining that “the implementation of further Good Samaritan laws in the United States would be wholly symbolic.”​[232]​ Yet, in the ensuing 20 years, 40 jurisdictions have passed new overdose Good Samaritan legislation to combat the opioid crisis.​[233]​ While once perceived as “probably unnecessary,”​[234]​ these laws now seem to be proliferating rather than dying out. This may foreshadow a greater reliance on new Good Samaritan laws in the future to address additional burgeoning public health crises. This makes the task of reevaluating existing laws for the sake of improving future laws all the more important.
And, second, reevaluating existing laws is neither improper nor merely “at best academic”​[235]​—it is quite the opposite: it is both necessary and proper. Because laws must continually meet justificatory standards to remain in force,​[236]​ the need for ongoing reappraisal in the Good Samaritan context is self-evident. Good Samaritan laws, like other laws, must respond to actual social, legal, and moral realities, which legitimize and patronize their continued existence. To the extent that a law’s tenets fall out of touch with the reality they purport to address, the law’s future utility as a behavioral guide must be critically reexamined. If Good Samaritan laws are to remain true to their proverbial namesake, then legislatures must ensure that data-informed accountability is at the heart of the policymaking process. 


















Table 3. Table of Laws
State	Statute 	Action Covered	Type of Liability Damages Covered (administrative, civil, criminal)	Pay Status	Good faith?	Location / Situation	Circumstances that Constitute Forfeiture of Good Samaritan Protection	Notes:
Alabama	Code of Ala. 6-5-332(a)	First aid or emergency care; provide or arrange for further medical care	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an accident, casualty, disaster	None specified	
Alabama	Code of Ala. 6-5-332(g)	Emergency care; provide or arrange for further medical care	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	Reasonably prudent person acting under the same or similar circumstances	
Alabama	Code of Ala. 34-29-90(a)	Emergency care or treatment to a domestic animal; ordering hospitalization of an animal	Damages (type not specified); Hospital expenses	Without fee 	Yes	None Specified	None specified	
Alabama	Code of Ala. 34-29-90(b)	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	None specified	
Alaska	Alaska Stat. 09.65.090(a)	Emergency care or emergency counseling	Civil	None specified	No*	Hospital or any location	Gross negligence, reckless, or intentional misconduct	*Good Samaritan "reasonably perceives" the person to be in need of "emergency aid"
Alaska	Alaska Stat. 18.08.086(a)	Emergency medical services	Civil	None specified	Yes	None specified	Reckless, willful, wanton misconduct or breach of a duty to act as a director or coordinator of emergency medical services	
Alaska	Alaska Stat. 09.65.097	Emergency or care to an injured or ill animal	Civil	None specified	No*	None Specified	Gross negligence, reckless, or intentional misconduct; rendering aid at owner's request	*Good Samaritan "reasonably perceives" the animal to be in need of "emergency aid"
Alaska	Alaska Stat. 09.65.300	Health care services	Civil	Without compensation, except expenses (travel, room, and board)	No	Medical clinic, medical facility, nonprofit facility, temporary emergency site, government-owned facility	Gross negligence or reckless or intentional misconduct;	
Arizona	ARS 13-403(5)	Emergency care; reasonable force to administer recognized and lawful form of treatment	Criminal	None specified	No	Scene of an emergency	Failure to obtain consent when it is easily obtainable	
Arizona	ARS 32-1471	Emergency care; provide or arrange for further medical care	Civil or other damages	Gratuitously 	Yes	Public gathering or scene of an emergency	Gross negligence	
Arizona	ARS 9-500.02(A)	Emergency medical aid; provide or arrange for further medical care	Civil or other damages	None specified	No	None Specified	Gross negligence or intentional misconduct or while an emergency medical care technician is operating a motor vehicle 	
Arizona	ARS 32-2261	Emergency treatment to sick or injured animal	Damages (type not specified) to animal's owner	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Gross negligence	
Arkansas	ACA 17-95-101(a)	Emergency care or assistance	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Place of an emergency or accident	Gross negligence or intentional misconduct	
Arkansas	ACA 17-95-101(b)	Emergency assistance or service	Civil	None specified	Yes	Emergency or accident	Not in good faith and the result of gross negligence or willful misconduct	
California	Cal Bus & Prof Code 2727.5	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency; outside the Good Samaritan's place of employment	Gross negligence or care provided in the course of employment	
California	Cal Bus & Prof Code 3706	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency; outside the Good Samaritan's place of employment	Gross negligence or care provided in the course of employment	
California	Cal Bus & Prof Code 3503.5	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency; outside the Good Samaritan's place of employment	Gross negligence or care provided in the course of employment	
California	Cal Bus & Prof Code 2395	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency; hospital emergency room before and during a California-declared state of emergency	Gross negligence or care provided in the course of employment	
California	Cal Health & Saf Code 1799.102(a)	Emergency medical care or nonmedical care	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Scene of an emergency	None specified	
California	Cal Health & Saf Code 1799.102(b)	Emergency medical care or nonmedical care	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Colorado	CRS 13-21-108(2)	Emergency care or assistance	Civil	Without compensation, except may recover actual costs incurred from providing care	Yes	Place of an emergency or accident	None specified	
Colorado	CRS 13-21-108(1)	Emergency care or assistance	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Place of an emergency or accident (includes medical facility)	Gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, and if the person receiving the care was a patient of a physician or surgeon rending the care	
Connecticut	Conn Gen Stat 52-557b(a)	Emergency medical or professional assistance, use of AED 	Civil	Gratuitously 	No	None Specified	Gross, willful, or wanton negligence or care provided in the course of employment	
Delaware	24 Del. C. 1773A(c)	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Gross or wanton negligence or at the place of employment	
Delaware	16 Del. C. 6801(a)	First aid, emergency treatment, or rescue assistance	Damages (type not specified)	Without expectation of monetary or other compensation; members of nonprofit volunteer or governmental ambulance service may charge a service fee and may also receive salaries	No	None Specified	Gross, willful, wanton, or reckless negligence or care provided on the premises of a hospital or clinic	
Delaware	16 Del. C. 6830	Intervenes against a criminal act involving death, serious injury, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, or sexual intercourse	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Scene of an attempted criminal act	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Delaware	24 Del. C. 1767	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Gross or wanton negligence	
Delaware	16 Del. C. 6802	Emergency care or transporting victim to nearest medical facility	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Gross negligence or willful harm	
Washington D.C.	D.C. Code 7-401(a)	Emergency medical care or assistance	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	Gross negligence or care provided in a hospital or failure to relinquish direction of the care when an appropriately licensed individual is available to assume responsibility for care	
Florida	Fla. Stat. 768.13(2)(a)	Emergency care or treatment; arranging for further medical treatment	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Failure to act as an "ordinary reasonably prudent person", or care provided on the premises of a medical facility or care provided over the objection of the victim	
Florida	Fla. Stat. 768.13(3)	Emergency care or treatment to an injured animal; arranging for further medical treatment	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an emergency on or adjacent to a roadway	Failure to act as an "ordinary reasonably prudent person"	
Georgia	OCGA 43-50-80	Emergency treatment to sick or injured animal	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	Gross negligence	
Georgia	OCGA 51-1-29	Emergency care, including attempted rescue of incapacitated or endangered person in locked motor vehicle	Civil	Without making any charge	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	None specified	
Guam	20 GCA 2104	Emergency care or assistance	Civil	Without compensation	No	Place of an emergency or accident	Gross negligence or wanton misconduct	
Hawaii	HRS 663-1.5(a)	Emergency care	Civil	Without remuneration or expectation of remuneration	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	Gross negligence or wanton misconduct	
Hawaii	HRS 663-1.5(c)	Emergency medical care	Civil	Without remuneration or expectation of remuneration	Yes	Inside a hospital	Failure to exercise standard of care of physicians or physician assistants in similar circumstances	
Idaho	Idaho Code 5-330	First aid or medical attention*	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an accident	Gross negligence	*Immunity ceases once a health care professional assumes care over the victim/patient
Illinois	745 ILCS 49/42	Emergency care	Civil	Without fee 	Yes	Scene of an accident	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Illinois	745 ILCS 49/46	Emergency care	Civil	Without fee 	Yes	None Specified	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Illinois	745 ILCS 49/25	Emergency care	Civil	Without fee 	Yes	None Specified	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Illinois	745 ILCS 49/34	Emergency care	Civil	Without fee 	Yes	None Specified	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Illinois	745 ILCS 49/45	Emergency care	Civil	Without fee 	Yes	None Specified	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Illinois	745 ILCS 49/55	Emergency care	Civil	Without fee 	Yes	Scene of an accident, emergency, or disaster	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Illinois	745 ILCS 49/15	Emergency care	Civil	Without fee 	Yes	Scene of an accident	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Illinois	745 ILCS 49/60	Emergency care to human	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an accident or catastrophe	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Illinois	745 ILCS 49/35	Emergency care	Civil	Without fee 	Yes	None Specified	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Illinois	745 ILCS 49/50	Emergency care	Civil	Without fee 	Yes	Scene of an accident or nuclear attack	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Indiana	Burns Ind. Code Ann. 25-38.1-4-7	Emergency treatment to sick or injured animal	Damages (type not specified)	None specified	No	None Specified	Gross negligence	
Indiana	Burns Ind. Code Ann. 34-30-12-1(b)	Emergency medical aid; provide or arrange for further medical care	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an emergency or accident	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Iowa	Iowa Code 152B.10	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Gross negligence	
Iowa	Iowa Code 613.17(1)	Emergency care or assistance	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Scene of an emergency or en route from the scene of an emergency	Reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct	
Kansas	KSA 65-2891b	Emergency care or assistance	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Scene of an emergency or accident	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Kansas	KSA 47-841(a)	Emergency treatment to an animal, including ordering the hospitalization of an animal	Damages (type not specified); Hospital fees	Without fee 	Yes	None Specified	None specified	
Kansas	KSA 47-841(b)	Emergency care to human	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	None specified	
Kansas	KSA 65-2891(a)	Emergency care or assistance; treatment of minor without consent	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency or accident	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Kansas	KSA 65-2891(b)	Emergency care or assistance to an individual who is not a current patient	Civil	With or without compensation	Yes	Scene of an emergency or accident inside a hospital or elsewhere	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Kentucky	KRS 411.148	Emergency care or treatment	Civil	Without remuneration or expectation of remuneration	No	Scene of an emergency outside a facility having proper medical equipment	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Kentucky	KRS 311A.150	Emergency care or treatment	Civil	Without remuneration or expectation of remuneration	No	Scene of an emergency outside a facility having proper medical equipment	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Louisiana	La.R.S. 37:1731(E)	Emergency care or services; provide or arrange for further medical treatment	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an emergency	None specified	
Louisiana	La.R.S. 37:1731(D)	Emergency care or services; provide or arrange for further medical treatment	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an emergency; not including a dentist office or hospital	None specified	
Louisiana	La.R.S. 37:1731(C)	Emergency care or services to an animal; provide or arrange for further medical treatment	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an emergency	None specified	
Louisiana	La.R.S. 37:1731(B)	Emergency care or services	Administrative*	Gratuitously 	No	Scene of an emergency	None specified	*Out-of-state practitioner not charged with violation of state medical practice act
Louisiana	La.R.S. 37:1731(A)	Emergency care or services; provide or arrange for further medical treatment	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Willful or wanton misconduct or gross negligence	
Louisiana	La. R.S. 9:2793	Emergency care, first aid, or rescue; provide or arrange for further medical treatment	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Intentional or gross negligence	
Marshall Islands	19 MIRC 626	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency; any place other than within a health care facility	None specified*	*Statute provides protection for reckless acts
Maine	14 MRS 164	First aid, emergency treatment, or rescue assistance	Damages (type not specified)	Without expectation of monetary or other compensation; members of nonprofit volunteer or governmental ambulance service may charge a service fee and may also receive salaries	No	None Specified	Gross, willful, wanton, or reckless negligence or care provided on the premises of a hospital or clinic	
Maine	32 MRS 4877	Emergency care of animal when owner cannot be located	Administrative	None specified	Yes	None Specified	None Specified	
Maine	32 MRS 4874	First aid, emergency treatment, or rescue assistance to an animal	Damages (type not specified)	Without expectation of monetary or other compensation	No	None Specified	Gross, willful, wanton, or reckless negligence	
Maine	32 MRS 2594	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	No	Scene of an accident	Failure to act in due care	
Maryland	Md. Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Ann 5-603	Assistance or medical care	Civil	Without fee 	No	Scene of an emergency or en route from the scene of an emergency	Gross negligence	
Maryland	Md. Agriculture Code Ann. 2-314	Emergency veterinary aid, care, or assistance without consent of animal owner	Civil	Without compensation	No	None Specified	Gross negligence	
Massachusetts	ALM GL ch. 112 12B	Emergency care or treatment outside the ordinary course of practice; ordering hospitalization	Damages (type not specified); hospital fees	Without fee 	Yes	None Specified	None specified	
Massachusetts	ALM GL ch. 112 58A	Emergency care or treatment to an animal outside the ordinary course of practice; ordering hospitalization	Damages (type not specified); hospital fees	Without fee 	Yes	None Specified	None specified	
Massachusetts	ALM GL ch. 112 12V	Emergency care	None specified	Without compensation	Yes	None Specified	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Michigan	MCLS 333.18826	Emergency care, including euthanasia, to a seriously ill or injured animal without the owner's consent	Civil	None specified	No	None Specified	None Specified	
Michigan	MCLS 691.1501(1)	Emergency care where no previous practitioner-patient relationship exists	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Michigan	MCLS 691.1502	Emergency care where no previous practitioner-patient relationship exists	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency inside a hospital	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Minnesota	Minn. Stat. 604A.01	Reasonable emergency care, advice, or assistance outside of regular employment obligations	Civil	Without compensation	No	Scene of an emergency (not including a health care facility) or en route from the scene of an emergency	Willful or wanton or reckless manner	*Failure to provide reasonable aid could result in a petty misdemeanor 
Mississippi	Miss. Code Ann. 73-25-37(1)	Emergency care or transporting victim to a medical facility	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency	None specified	
Missouri	340.287 R.S.Mo.	Emergency treatment to sick or injured animal	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	Gross negligence	
Missouri	340.328 R.S.Mo.	Emergency treatment to sick or injured animal	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	Gross negligence	
Missouri	537.037 R.S.Mo. 1	Emergency care or assistance including treatment of minor without parental/guardian consent	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Scene of an emergency or accident	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Missouri	537.037 R.S.Mo. 2	Emergency care or assistance	Civil	Without compensation	No	Scene of an emergency or accident	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Montana	27-1-714, MCA	Emergency care or assistance	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Scene of an emergency or accident	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Nebraska	R.R.S. Neb. 25-21,186	Emergency care or medical treatment	Civil	Gratuitously 	No	Scene of an emergency or accident	None specified	
Nebraska	R.R.S. Neb. 38-1232(1)	Public emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	None Specified	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct; operation of motor vehicle, aircraft, or boat; intoxication	
Nevada	Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 41.500(1)	Emergency care or assistance; arrange for further medical treatment	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Emergency situation	Gross negligence	
Nevada	Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 41.500(2)	Emergency care or assistance	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency or en route from the scene of an emergency to a medical facility	Gross negligence	
New Hampshire	RSA 328-D:14	Emergency care; arrange for further medical care	Civil	No direct compensation	Yes	Scene of an emergency	None specified	
New Hampshire	RSA 508:12	Emergency care	Civil	No direct compensation	Yes	Scene of an emergency or crime or en route from the scene of an emergency or crime	Willful or wanton negligence; failure to place the victim in the care of a medical professional	
New Hampshire	RSA 326-B:36(I)	Emergency care outside the course of employment; arrange for further medical care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Care provided at the place of employment	
New Hampshire	RSA 329:25	Emergency care; arrange for further medical care	Civil	Without making any charge	Yes	Scene of an emergency	None specified	
New Hampshire	RSA 153-A:17(II)	Emergency medical services	Administrative	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency en route to place of employment	None specified	
New Jersey	N.J. Stat. 45:16-9.11	Emergency or care to an injured or ill animal	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	None specified	
New Jersey	N.J. Stat. 2A:62A-1	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency	None specified	
New Jersey	N.J. Stat. 2A:62A-1.2	Care; transporting to a medical facility	Civil	Volunteer or paid	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	Gross negligence	
New Jersey	N.J. Stat. 2A:62A-1.1	Care; transporting to a medical facility	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	Gross negligence	
New Jersey	N.J. Stat. 45:9-27.18a(c)(1)	Emergency medical assistance; emergency care	Civil	Gratuitously 	No	None Specified	Care provided during employment	
New Mexico	NM Stat. Ann. 24-10-3	Care or assistance	Civil	Without remuneration or expectation of remuneration	Yes	At or near scene of an emergency	Gross negligence	
New York	NY CLS Educ 6527	First aid or emergency treatment	Damages (type not specified)	Without expectation of monetary compensation	No	Scene of an emergency or accident; outside of a properly-equipped medical facility	Gross negligence	
New York	NY CLS Educ 6737	First aid or emergency treatment	Damages (type not specified)	Without expectation of monetary compensation	No	Scene of an emergency or accident; outside of a properly-equipped medical facility	Gross negligence	
New York	NY CLS Educ 6909(1)	First aid or emergency treatment	Damages (type not specified)	Without expectation of monetary compensation	No	Scene of an emergency or accident; outside of a properly-equipped medical facility	Gross negligence	
New York	NY CLS Educ 6705-a	First aid or emergency treatment to an animal	Damages (type not specified)	Without expectation of monetary compensation	No	Scene of an emergency or accident; outside of a properly-equipped medical facility	Gross negligence	
New York	NY CLS Educ 6611(6)	First aid or emergency treatment	Damages (type not specified)	Without expectation of monetary compensation	No	Scene of an emergency or accident; outside of a properly-equipped medical facility	Gross negligence	
New York	NY CLS Educ 7006(3)	First aid or emergency treatment	Damages (type not specified)	Without expectation of monetary compensation	No	Scene of an emergency or accident; outside of a properly-equipped medical facility	Gross negligence	
New York	NY CLS Educ 6545	First aid or emergency treatment	Damages (type not specified)	Without expectation of monetary compensation	No	Scene of an emergency or accident; outside of a properly-equipped medical facility	Gross negligence	
New York	NY Pub Health 3000-a(1)	First aid or emergency treatment	Damages (type not specified)	Without expectation of monetary compensation	No	Scene of an emergency or accident; outside of a properly-equipped medical facility	Gross negligence	
North Carolina	N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-21.14	First aid or emergency health care treatment	Damages (type not specified)	Without expectation of compensation	No	None Specified	Wanton or intentional misconduct	
North Carolina	N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-166(d)	First aid or emergency assistance	Civil	None specified	No	Scene of a motor vehicle crash on any street or highway	Gross negligence or wanton or intentional misconduct	
North Dakota	N.D. Cent. Code, 32-03.1-02	Emergency aid or assistance	Civil	None specified	No	Accident or illness	Intentional misconduct or gross negligence	
North Dakota	N.D. Cent. Code, 39-08-04.1	Emergency care or services	Damages (type not specified)	Without remuneration or expectation of remuneration	Yes	Scene of an accident, disaster, emergency, or en route to a health care facility	Gross negligence or willful misconduct; intoxication	
Northern Mariana Islands	7 CMC 2803	Emergency care	Civil	Not for compensation	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Gross negligence; care provided in places where medical care is usually offered	
Ohio	ORC Ann. 2305.23	Emergency care or treatment	Civil	Without remuneration or expectation of remuneration	No	Scene of an emergency outside of a properly-equipped medical facility	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Oklahoma	59 Okl. St. 518	Emergency care or treatment, including of a minor without parent or guardian consent	Civil and criminal	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency	None specified	
Oklahoma	59 Okl. St. 698.17	Emergency care or treatment to a human or animal	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of accident or disaster	None specified	
Oklahoma	76 Okl. St. 5(a)(1)	Emergency care	Damages (type not specified)	Without compensation	Yes	Wherever required	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Oregon	ORS 686.440	Emergency treatment or euthanasia	Civil	None specified	No	None Specified	Gross negligence	
Oregon	ORS 30.800	Emergency medical assistance	Damages (type not specified)	Without expectation of compensation	Yes	Emergency circumstances	Gross negligence; care provided in places where medical care is usually offered	
Palau	34 PNC 227	Emergency care*	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Care provided in hospital or medical clinic	*Covers reckless acts or omissions
Pennsylvania	42 Pa.C.S.A. 8332	Emergency care, treatment, first aid, or rescue; transporting to a medical facility	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency or crime or en route from the scene of an emergency or crime	Gross negligence or intentional misconduct; operating a vehicle	
Pennsylvania	42 Pa. C.S.A. 8331	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency	Gross negligence or intentional misconduct	
Pennsylvania	42 Pa.C.S.A 8331.1	Emergency care to an animal	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	Gross negligence or intentional misconduct; owner of animal is present	
Rhode Island	R.I. Gen. Laws 5-37-14	Emergency medical assistance	Civil	Gratuitously 	No	None Specified	Gross negligence and willful or wanton negligence; care provided in ordinary course of employment or in a place where medical care is usually offered	
Rhode Island	R.I. Gen. Laws 5-54-20.1	Emergency medical assistance	Civil	Gratuitously 	No	None Specified	Gross negligence and willful or wanton negligence; care provided in ordinary course of employment or in a place where medical care is usually offered	
Rhode Island	R.I. Gen. Laws 5-34-34	Emergency medical assistance	Civil	Gratuitously 	No	None Specified	Gross negligence and willful or wanton negligence; care provided in ordinary course of employment or in a place where medical care is usually offered	
Rhode Island	CRIR 14-140-042(11.1)	Emergency veterinary assistance to an animal	Civil	Gratuitously 	No	None Specified	Gross negligence	
Rhode Island	R.I. Gen. Laws 23-4.1-12(e)	First aid, emergency treatment, rescue assistance, or transport services	Civil	Without expectation of monetary or other compensation	Yes	Scene of an accident, fire, or emergency or en route to medical facility	None specified	
Rhode Island	R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-27.1	Emergency assistance	Civil	Gratuitously 	No	None Specified	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
South Carolina	S.C. Code Ann. 15-1-310	Emergency care; arrange for further medical treatment	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an accident or emergency	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
South Dakota	S.D. Codified Laws 20-9-3	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency	None specified	
South Dakota	S.D. Codified Laws 20-9-4.1	Emergency care and services, including operation of a motor vehicle	Civil	None specified	Yes	During an emergency	Willful or wanton or reckless manner	
South Dakota	S.D. Codified Laws 36-4A-26.3	Emergency medical assistance	Civil	Gratuitously 	No	None Specified	Willful or wanton negligence; care provided in a place where medical care is usually offered	
South Dakota	S.D. Codified Laws 20-9-4	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency	None specified	
Tennessee	Tenn. Code Ann. 63-12-142	Emergency treatment to sick or injured animal	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	None Specified	Gross negligence	
Tennessee	Tenn. Code Ann. 63-6-218	Emergency public first aid and rescue services; arrange for further medical treatment	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an accident, medical emergency, or disaster or en route to medical facility	Gross negligence	
Texas	Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 74.152	Emergency care	Civil	With or without compensation	Yes	None Specified	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Texas	Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 74.151	Emergency care	Civil	Without remuneration or expectation of remuneration	Yes	None Specified	Willful or wanton misconduct	
Texas	Tex. Occ. Code 801.358	Emergency treatment to sick or injured animal	Damages (type not specified)	None specified	No	Care provided on practitioner initiative or at request of someone other than animal's owner	Gross negligence	
Texas	Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 92.002	Treatment of nonlivestock animal	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Emergency, abandonment of animal, injury to animal	Gross negligence	
Utah	Utah Code Ann. 78B-4-501(1)	Emergency care	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	At or near scene of an emergency	Gross negligence	
Utah	Utah Code Ann. 58-13-2	Emergency care	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	Scene of an emergency	None specified	
Utah	Utah Code Ann. 58-31b-701	Emergency care	Civil	Gratuitously 	Yes	At or near scene of an emergency	Gross negligence	
Vermont	12 V.S.A. 519	Reasonable assistance*	Civil	Without remuneration or expectation of remuneration	No	None Specified	Gross negligence	*Failure to provide reasonable assistance could result in a fine
Virgin Islands	27 V.I.C. 42	Emergency assistance	Civil	Gratuitously 	No	None Specified	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
Virginia	Va. Code Ann. 8.01-225(5)	Emergency care or assistance	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Anywhere or while transporting between medical facilities	None specified	
Virginia	Va. Code Ann. 8.01-225.2	Emergency care or treatment to an injured animal	Damages (type not specified) to animal's owner	Without compensation	Yes	Scene of an emergency	None specified	
Virginia	Va. Code Ann. 8.01-225(1)–(3), (6)	Emergency care or assistance; forcible entry into motor vehicle	Civil	Without compensation	Yes	Scene of an accident, fire, or life-threatening emergency or en route to a hospital	None specified	
Washington	RCW 4.24.300(1)	Emergency care or transporting victim to a medical facility	Civil	Without remuneration or expectation of remuneration	No	Scene of an emergency	Gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct	
West Virginia	W. Va. Code 55-7-15	Emergency care	Civil	Without remuneration 	Yes	Scene of an accident or crime	None specified	
Wisconsin	Wis. Stat. 940.34	Reasonable assistance*	Civil	Without remuneration or expectation of remuneration	No	None Specified	None specified	*Failure to provide reasonable assistance could result in a Class C misdemeanor 
Wisconsin	Wis. Stat. 895.48	Emergency care	Civil	None specified	Yes	Scene of an emergency	None specified	
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